For the record, Rorty disagrees with Hirsch but also think the Knapp-Michaels approach did not succeed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rorty begins by pointing out that not everyone agrees with their assessment that a random string of symbols appearing to be language has no meaning if there was no authorial intent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
H.P. Grice is one person in this camp. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is a more subtle question that still leaves some room for theory: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Granted that the sentence means such and such, did its author use it to mean that on this particular occasion?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Rorty takes what seems to be a radical view here. He claims that anything should be counted as language if a human construes it as such (he even includes “an arrangement of stars” as an example).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Recall that Rorty is a pragmatist, so basically he wants to say that Knapp-Michaels are being wildly unpragmatic with their view that we must always identify an author before considering something that looks like language to be language (i.e. have meaning). <\/p>\n\n\n\n
How do they know that the random symbols in the sand at the beach have no meaning if they come across them and can’t tell if it is an accident or intended?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Intrinsic Properties<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Trying to identify intrinsic properties is futile in a pragmatic framework. Rorty wants to forget the question of what was intended and instead examine the language in various contexts and describe the advantages\/disadvantages as such. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We can never “know” the true authorial intent as a pragmatic matter anyway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This view is clearly against Hirsch and an argument “against theory” (stop theorizing and interpret already!). But I’m not sure how he escapes the paradox that by describing why he feels this way, he has laid out the foundation for a pragmatic “theory” of interpretation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It’s a Catch-22. No one has the answer to why<\/em> we should be pragmatic without the theory to back it up.<\/p>\n\n\n\nPoststructuralists<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Rorty tries to escape these endless circles by appealing to Heidegger and Derrida. The philosophers who developed theory have skewed the debate by the terms they’ve deemed important enough to study: intention\/meaning\/etc. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This jargon is in place because of tradition, and we should first ask if we have any reason to continue to go along with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We can’t argue against theory by using the language of theory. The vocabulary must be changed first, and vocabulary doesn’t change through arguments. It changes because a new vocabulary comes into usage and serves the discussion better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rorty takes the view that we shouldn’t stop teaching theory because it gives philosophers the opportunity to discuss novels, poems, and essays with literature students. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is wrong-headed for Knapp-Michaels to think of teaching theory as some sort of indoctrination into a particular view of interpretation that skips out on the actual interpretation of texts (personal note: I don’t blame them if you think back to the New Critical climate in which the original essay was written).<\/p>\n\n\n\n